8. Terrain and the Battle of Fredericksburg, December 13, 1862

By Judy Ehlen¹

¹1408 William Street, Fredericksburg, VA 22401.

Introduction

The area around Fredericksburg, Va., was a major theater of operations in the American Civil War (1861–1865), beginning with the Battle of Fredericksburg in December 1862. The city and its environs along the Rappahannock River in north-central Virginia were significant obstacles to Union advances on Richmond, the Confederate capital. The battlefield consists of a series of flood plains and river terraces with gentle slopes paralleled by north-south ridges that provide structural boundaries on either side, all composed of Tertiary and Quaternary Coastal Plain sediments. The Confederates, led by General Robert E. Lee, effectively used natural terrain features to impede attacks made by the Union army. Tactical benefits were also accrued by the Confederates from manmade obstacles on the battlefield, such as stone walls and fences. After crossing the Rappahannock River, the Union army, led by Major General Ambrose E. Burnside, was forced to attack uphill with little cover in its unsuccessful attempts to dislodge the Confederates. Effective use of the terrain thus enabled Confederate forces to defeat the Union army at the Battle of Fredericksburg, which helped delay Union capture of Richmond for almost three years.

Battlefield Terrain

Fredericksburg is located on the west side of the Rappahannock River, partly on flood plain and partly on terraces about 6 to 15 meters (m) (20–50 feet (ft)) or more above the river (fig. 1). The city is about 1,800 m (1.1 miles (mi)) southeast of the Fall Line. The materials forming the terraces are Pleistocene sediments—clay, sandy silt, sand, with some gravel—of the Shirley, Chuckatuck, and Charles City Formations (Mixon and others, 2000). Although only about 1 kilometer (km) (0.62 mi) wide in the vicinity of the city, the terraces widen considerably to the south. High ridges parallel the river on both sides—Stafford Heights to the east and Marye’s Heights and a series of hills, including Willis Hill, Telegraph Hill, Howison’s Hill and Prospect Hill, to the west. This western ridge curves toward the river about 6 km (3.7 mi) south of the city, forming a wide, open amphitheater. Stafford Heights is formed of the same materials as the terraces in Fredericksburg, and Marye’s Heights is composed of Tertiary sands and gravels and the Cretaceous Potomac Formation (Mixon and others, 2000). The terraces are separated from Marye’s Heights by a narrow band of Quaternary gravelly sand, sandy silt, and clay (primarily the Chuckatuck Formation; Mixon and others, 2000). In the vicinity of Fredericksburg, the Rappahannock is narrow but quite deep, and is treacherous to cross even at low water. During the Civil War, there were no fords or bridges downstream from Fredericksburg, and by the time the battle occurred, bridges that existed in the city before the war had been destroyed.

In the southern part of the battlefield, a low terrace about 3.2 km (2.0 mi) wide slopes uphill from the west bank of the river to the base of the ridge with a grade of about 4.5 percent. The ridge is formed primarily by the Calvert and Aquia Formations, which are mainly sand. Deep Run and Hazel Run flow across the terrace to the river. During the Civil War, the land was cultivated and “. . . much cut up by hedges and ditches” (U.S. War Department, 1888, p. 449). Other obstacles on the terrace included the main road south to Richmond, a railroad embankment, fences, ditches, and a stone wall. Trees were present only in the ravines formed by Hazel and Deep Runs and near the river (O’Reilly, 1993). In this area, the ridge, which is heavily wooded, curves toward the river and is about 60 m (200 ft) above the terrace at Prospect Hill.

The northern part of the battlefield consists of the terraces upon which Fredericksburg is located, a swampy valley to the west (herein called Kenmore valley for ease of reference) occupied by a ditch or millrace that drained the canal network in the industrial section of the city to the north, and a sloping terrace that ends against Marye’s Heights. The 150-m (500-ft)-wide lower terrace is about 6 m (20 ft) above the river, and the upper terrace, about 9 m (30 ft) higher than the lower terrace and 600 m (660 yards (yd)) wide, is west of town. The millrace in Kenmore valley was about 4.5 m (15 ft) wide and between 1.5 and 1.8 m (5 and 6 ft) deep (Whan, 1961), and could be crossed by bridges that carried the main streets. The west side of the valley in this area is a steep, 6-m (20-ft)-high bluff. The 275-m (300-yd)-wide, sloping terrace leading up to Marye’s Heights has a grade of about 3 percent and consisted of open fields with isolated houses and gardens (Stackpole, 1991). Telegraph Road, a sunken road with stone walls on both sides at the time of the battle, ran parallel to Marye’s Heights at the base of the ridge.

The Battle

In early November 1862, Major General Ambrose E. Burnside, recently appointed commander of the Union Army of the Potomac, proposed to take Richmond using the shortest, most direct route from Washington. This route went through the city of Fredericksburg (fig. 2).

Burnside’s army was located at this time near Warrenton, and the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia, commanded by General Robert E. Lee, was located on both sides of the Blue Ridge—in the Shenandoah Valley and near Culpeper. As supplies were moved south from Washington by boat and rail, the two armies moved southeast, meeting at Fredericksburg. Burnside’s army consisted of more than 110,000 men separated into three “Grand Divisions” commanded by Major Generals Edwin V. Sumner, William B. Franklin, and Joseph Hooker. When the army reached Fredericksburg between November 15 and 20, it took positions along Stafford Heights east of Fredericksburg and the Rappahannock River. Franklin was on the left flank to the south; Sumner on the right flank to the north; and Hooker, in reserve, behind Sumner (Esposito, 1959).

Lee’s army consisted of two corps comprising about 80,000 soldiers commanded by Lieutenant Generals Thomas “Stonewall” Jackson and James Longstreet. When Lee realized Burnside had sent his army to Fredericksburg, he ordered Longstreet’s corps to the Fredericksburg area to protect the route to Richmond and safeguard the rich agricultural area near Fredericksburg (Stackpole, 1991; O’Reilly, 2003). Both Confederate corps were in position on the ridge west of the city by December 5. Longstreet occupied the northern part of the ridge west of town opposite Sumner, and Jackson occupied the southern end of the ridge opposite Franklin (Esposito, 1959). Jackson’s line extended some distance downriver: Lee was not sure where Burnside’s attack would occur, so he extended Jackson’s line to cover all possibilities.

The Battle of Fredericksburg, which occurred on December 13, 1862, has been well described in numerous books, including Whan (1961), Stackpole (1991), O’Reilly (1993), Gallagher (1995), Rable (2002), and O’Reilly (2003), in addition to Volume 21 of the Official Records (U.S. War Department, 1888), newly released in its entirety on CD-ROM. Sections on the battle can also be found in Esposito (1959) and Johnson and Buel (1956). In addition, Luvaas and Nelson (1994) have prepared an excellent guide to the battle for use with military staff rides. Because the battle is so well described in easily accessible publications, only the highlights will be described here.

Burnside intended to attack across the Rappahannock using pontoon bridges. Although ordered long in advance, the pontoons did not arrive until late November (Stackpole, 1991); crossing points were not selected until December 10, after the Confederate army was in position. Preparations for battle thus began on December 10 with the construction of pontoon bridges at three locations: two at the north end of Fredericksburg (fig. 3), one at the south end (fig. 4), and three farther south beyond Deep Run. On December 11, construction of the upper and middle pontoon bridges was disrupted by Confederate sharpshooters deployed in houses connected with trenches on the river edge of the lower terrace (Whan, 1961). The formidable Union artillery on Stafford Heights could not provide adequate protection for the engineers due to heavy fog (U.S. War Department, 1888) and because the gun crews could not depress the barrels of their cannons sufficiently. Federal artillery on Stafford Heights comprised 147 guns, many of large caliber, including 20-pounder Parrotts and 4.5 inch (in) siege rifles (O’Reilly, 2003). After the fog lifted, nine unsuccessful attempts were made to complete the upper bridges (McLaws, 1956). Eventually, volunteers forced a bridgehead, allowing the engineers to complete the bridges and the infantry to cross the river (Rable, 2002). The Confederates were slowly forced back to the upper terrace. The fierce hand-to-hand fighting along city streets and between buildings was one of the few instances of urban warfare during the Civil War (O’Reilly, 2003). Union bridge builders faced only minimal opposition during construction of the middle bridge because the terrain beyond the bluff, consisting of open fields sloping gently upward to the base of the western ridge, exposed Confederate defenders to the Union artillery on Stafford Heights. There was also little opposition to construction of the lower bridges for the same reason—there was no cover to protect Confederate troops from the Union artillery. By nightfall on December 12, Burnside’s army had crossed the Rappahannock River and was on the flood plain and on the lower terrace throughout Fredericksburg.

The Union attack began mid-morning on December 13 (McLaws, 1956). Burnside’s battle plan called for Franklin to attack first and seize Prospect Hill, the right flank of Jackson’s line. Once this had been accomplished, Sumner was to attack and seize Marye’s Heights from Longstreet’s corps. Hooker’s corps was held in reserve.

Franklin’s attack began about 1000 (10:00 a.m.) with an artillery barrage. One gun, a 12-pounder Napoleon (fig. 5), from Confederate Lieutenant General J.E.B. Stuart’s Horse Artillery, slowed the initial infantry attack that began about an hour later by enfilading the Union line (firing on the line of advancing troops at an angle to their front) from a depression near Hamilton’s Crossing (O’Reilly, 1993). Union artillery soon forced the gun to retire, but the delay allowed Jackson to clearly see the Union position (O’Reilly, 1993). The Confederate artillery, concealed by woods, withheld fire during the Union artillery barrage, and did not open fire until the advancing infantry were well within range, about 720 m (790 yd) from the Confederate guns (U.S. War Department, 1888; O’Reilly, 1993, 2003). As a result, Franklin’s generals did not know exactly where the Confederate forces were when the infantry attack began. Union Major General George Meade’s division spearheaded the attack, beginning about 1300. Confederate artillery fire from three sides funneled the Union infantry toward dense woods in the center of the Confederate line. Jackson had assumed the woods were impenetrable, and as a result, they were inadequately defended. Meade was thus able to penetrate the Confederate line at this point. He was unable to hold the position (Smith, 1956), even with support from a second division, and his forces were eventually pushed back. About 1430, Franklin received orders to attack with his entire force (Whan, 1961). Franklin’s new attack was to serve as a diversion to the heavy fighting west of town (Whan, 1961). Franklin had already deployed in a defensive position (O’Reilly, 2003), so was unable to provide relief for Sumner.

Burnside ordered Sumner to attack the Confederate position west of Fredericksburg shortly after 1030 (Whan, 1961), regardless of his earlier orders and without knowing the status of Franklin’s attack. He merely assumed that Franklin had been successful and that Lee had weakened his left flank to support his right (Freeman, 1943). Burnside should have known this was not the case, because by this time the fog had lifted and reports from his reconnaissance balloons above Stafford Heights would have indicated that Lee had not done so. Longstreet expected the main attack to occur on his right near Telegraph Hill, which was Lee’s headquarters (Luvaas and Nelson, 1994), but the attack was made against his center along the base of Marye’s Heights.

Union infantry marshalled in the city and on the upper terrace about 550 m (600 yd) from the base of Marye’s Heights. The advance was slowed by the millrace in Kenmore valley; the water was deep, covered by ice, and surrounded by marshy ground, and the walls of the millrace were lined with stone and with wooden boards (O’Reilly, 2003), so the only practical crossing points were the road bridges (Couch, 1956; fig. 6). This funneled the infantry toward the sunken part of Telegraph Road along the base of Marye’s Heights (fig. 7) and considerably restricted troop movements (U.S. War Department, 1888). As the Union skirmishers approached Marye’s Heights, they were hit by a wall of musket fire from the sunken road which they were unable to see (U.S. War Department, 1888; McLaws, 1956; Whan, 1961), and were forced back. Six attempts were made to take the Confederate position (Longstreet, 1956), but all failed, in part because of the difficulties caused by the terrain— that is, crossing the millrace.

At the end of the day, Union and Confederate infantry in the southern sector of the battlefield occupied the same positions they had occupied at the beginning of the day. West of town, Sumner’s infantry spent the night where they lay. Lee did not counterattack for several reasons. First, it was dark, and he expected Burnside to renew his attack the next day, so he did not want to lose his good defensive positions. Second, he was well aware of the devastation his army would face from the Union artillery on Stafford Heights if he did attack. Burnside, however, did not attack on December 14, although heavy skirmishing occurred throughout the day on both flanks. He in fact moved most of his army back from the front line and continued to fortify the city. Both armies now maintained defensive postures. The next day, Burnside requested a truce to care for the wounded and bury the dead. That night he moved his army across the Rappahannock under cover of a violent storm and removed the pontoon bridges (Freeman, 1943). On the morning of December 16, Lee was surprised to see no Union troops on the western side of the river, and knew then that although the battle was a defensive victory for the Army of Northern Virginia, it had gained them nothing. Although damaged, Burnside’s army was still intact and in position on Stafford Heights.

Effective Use of Terrain

Terrain was a crucial factor in the progress and outcome of the Battle of Fredericksburg. The favorable terrain was under Confederate control, whereas the terrain over which the Union infantry advanced was generally disadvantageous. As the battle progressed on December 13, the balance for the Confederates shifted from more vulnerable terrain south of Fredericksburg to superior terrain below Marye’s Heights west of Fredericksburg. The southern terrain was heavily defended, but here the Union forces had some freedom of movement and protection from Confederate infantry and artillery fire. The terrain below Marye’s Heights was less heavily defended, but Union forces in this area had no room to maneuver and little protection from Confederate fire. The main Union advantage in both sectors of the battlefield was the formidable heavy artillery on Stafford Heights (Rable, 2002; O’Reilly, 2003).

Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia occupied a defensive position on high ground, and Burnside’s Army of the Potomac was forced to attack uphill over lower ground. In addition, Union troops had numerous obstacles to negotiate— not least of which was the Rappahannock River. On Burnside’s left flank, these included, in addition to the river, the open nature of the terrace and deep ravines, numerous hedges and ditches in the open farmland, a railroad embankment, and the Richmond Road. In addition, the curved shape of the ridge gave Confederate artillery good positions for enfilading fire. On Burnside’s right flank the most significant obstacles, in addition to the river and the city itself, were the frozen millrace; limited space for troop deployments; the smooth, open ground below Marye’s Heights; numerous fences, houses and gardens; marshy areas both north and south of the main point of attack; the shape of the ridge that allowed Confederate enfilading fire; and most important, the sunken road and its stone walls.

Stackpole (1991) contends that the tactical Confederate success at Fredericksburg was based on Lee’s “. . . keen sense of terrain appreciation” (p. 172). Lee took a defensive position because “. . . the natural features of the ground were made to order for the purpose. . .” (p. 271). Lee’s judgment, confidence, and effective use of terrain, coupled with Burnside’s incompetence, indecision, and limited knowledge of the battlefield, appear to have been instrumental factors controlling the battle which thus contributed in no small part toward the final outcome.

Acknowledgments

This description of the Battle of Fredericksburg and the terrain upon which the battle was fought is based on a previously published paper co-authored with Robert J. Abrahart, University of Nottingham, United Kingdom (Ehlen and Abrahart, 2002). Although Bob had no involvement with this field guide, I wish to acknowledge his part in the work that led to its preparation. I also wish to thank Cynthia Merchant, Northborough, Mass., who assisted me in preparation of the road log.

References Cited

Couch, D.N., 1956, Sumner’s “Right Grand Division,” in Johnson, R.U., and Buel, C.C., eds., Battles and leaders of the Civil War; v. 3, Retreat from Gettysburg: New York, Castle Books, p. 105–120.

Ehlen, J., and Abrahart, R.J., 2002, Effective use of terrain in the American Civil War; The Battle of Fredericksburg, December 1862, in Doyle, P., and Bennett, M.B., eds., Fields of battle; Terrain in military history: Dordrecht, The Netherlands, Kluwer Academic Publishers, p. 63–97.

Esposito, Col. V.J., 1959, The West Point atlas of American wars; v. 1, 1689–1900: New York, Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, Maps 70–73.

Freeman, D.S., 1934, R.E. Lee, a biography; v. 2: New York, Charles Scribner’s Sons, p. 415–474.

Freeman, D.S., 1943, Lee’s lieutenants; v. 2, Cedar Mountain to Chancellorsville: New York, Charles Scribner’s Sons, p. 269–396.

Gallagher, G.W., ed., 1995, The Fredericksburg campaign; Decision on the Rappahannock: Chapel Hill, N.C., The University of North Carolina Press, 243 p.

Hazlett, J.C., Olmstead, E., and Parks, M.H., 1988, Field artillery weapons of the Civil War (2d ed.): Newark, Del., University of Delaware Press, 322 p.

Johnson, R.U., and Buel, C.C., eds., 1956, Battles and leaders of the Civil War; v. 3, Retreat from Gettysburg: New York, Castle Books, p. 70–147.

Longstreet, J., 1956, The Battle of Fredericksburg, in Johnson, R.U., and Buel, C.C., eds., Battles and leaders of the Civil War; v. 3, Retreat from Gettysburg: New York, Castle Books, p. 70–85.

Luvaas, J., and Nelson, H.W., eds., 1994, Guide to the Battles of Chancellorsville and Fredericksburg: Lawrence, Kans., University of Kansas Press, p. 1–128.

McLaws, L., 1956, The Confederate Left at Fredericksburg, in Johnson, R.U., and Buel, C.C., eds., Battles and leaders of the Civil War; v. 3, Retreat from Gettysburg: New York, Castle Books, p. 86–94.

Mixon, R.B., Pavlides, L., Powars, D.S., Froelich, A.J., Weems, R.E., Schindler, J.S., Newell, W.L., Edwards, L.E., and Ward, L.W., 2000, Geologic map of the Fredericksburg 30' × 60' quadrangle, Virginia and Maryland: U.S. Geological Survey Geologic Investigations Series Map I–2607, 2 sheets and pamphlet, scale 1:100,000.

O’Reilly, F.A., 1993, “Stonewall” Jackson at Fredericksburg; the Battle of Prospect Hill, December 13, 1862 (2d ed.): Lynchburg, Va., H.E. Howard, Inc., 243 p.

O’Reilly, F.A., 2003, The Fredericksburg campaign; Winter war on the Rappahannock: Baton Rouge, La., Louisiana State University Press, 630 p.

Rable, G.C., 2002, Fredericksburg! Fredericksburg!: Chapel Hill, N.C., The University of North Carolina Press, 671 p.

Reardon, C., 1995, The forlorn hope; Brig. Gen. Andrew A. Humphreys’s Pennsylvania Division at Fredericksburg, in Gallagher, G.W., ed., The Fredericksburg campaign; Decision on the Rappahannock: Chapel Hill, N.C., The University of North Carolina Press, p. 80–112.

Smith, W.F., 1956, Franklin’s “Left Grand Division," in Johnson, R.U., and Buel, C.C., eds., Battles and leaders of the Civil War; v. 3, Retreat from Gettysburg: New York, Castle Books, p. 128–138.

Stackpole, E.J., 1991, The Fredericksburg campaign (2d ed.): Mechanicsburg, Pa., Stackpole Books, 312 p.

U.S. War Department, 1888, The war of the rebellion; A compilation of the official records of the Union and Confederate Armies: Washington, Government Printing Office, Series 1, v. 21, 1280 p.

Whan, V.E., Jr., 1961, Fiasco at Fredericksburg: Gaithersburg, Md., Olde Soldiers Books, Inc., 159 p.

ROAD LOG AND STOP DESCRIPTIONS FOLLOW

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