Scott: You have covered the USGS earthquake program well, in my estimation. Could
you now say something about the principal other organizations and individuals
who were involved in earthquake-related programs? I realize that it is a pretty
complicated subject.
Wallace: Yes, it is a big subject, and what I can contribute will have to be very selective
and incomplete. I will also have to apologize in advance for leaving out many of
the people and institutions that had major influences. Nor can I begin to cover
the constant and chameleon-like changes, with the flow of people and activities
through programs like these.
I can identify periods of five to ten years in which the same names appear
on one advisory panel after another. Then ten years later, the whole cadre of
names would have changed, along with the priorities that topped their agendas.
Some institutions would have disappeared and new ones created. Individuals
retire or change jobs--some much-needed individuals are inconsiderate enough to
die. The fact of constant change is always with us.
Wallace: California state institutions have played enormous roles in the evolution of earthquake programs, and this is a complex story I can only touch on. Organizations such as the California Division of Mines and Geology (CDMG), the California Seismic Safety Commission, and the California Office of Emergency Services were extremely important. The Nevada Bureau of Mines and Geology was also deeply and effectively involved, as were other state surveys.
CDMG began to shift its priorities to do more on earthquakes. Wesley Bruer,
who was CDMG Chief at the time of the 1971 San Fernando earthquake, began
to emphasize hazards and other programs over minerals, and this track was
followed by his successors Jim Slosson and Jim Davis. For a few years in the
late 1980's, state politics placed Joe Ziony, who was well steeped in geologic
hazards after a career with the USGS, in effective control over the CDMG.
After Jim resumed his responsibilities at CDMG, Joe retired.
Scott: Yes, that business of the attempted demotion of Jim Davis and his later
reinstatement was complicated and traumatic. I respect your preference to say
nothing more about it.
Wallace: California Office of Emergency Services Director Dick Andrews, an academic and historian by background, but an extremely effective leader, had grown in stature in the earthquake arena as head of the Southern California Earthquake Preparedness Project, and later as Executive Director of the Seismic Safety Commission. Subsequently, he moved to the OES to the post he holds now.
Scott: As you know, over the years I have been especially interested in the Seismic
Safety Commission, having been a member for 18 years. Do you have any
observations about its history or role?
Wallace: I did discuss the idea of such a Commission with Karl Steinbrugge when he was
first thinking about it, but my own information is very incomplete. Your paper
with Bob Olson is one of the best documents about the SSC. The reference
should be given here for a more complete and accurate account than I could
possibly give. (Scott, Stanley and Olson, Robert, (eds.), California's Earthquake
Safety Policy: A Twentieth Anniversary Retrospective, 1969-1989, Earthquake
Engineering Research Center, University of California, Berkeley, December
1993.)
Scott: You had some very direct experience with one state-regional agency that has
always interested me, ever since the days when I was a consultant to the original
San Francisco Bay Conservation and Development Commission (BCDC). Would
you discuss that?
Wallace: I can describe the BCDC organization on which I served--the Engineering
Criteria Review Board (ECRB). I had the honor of chairing the board for about
10 years, and continued well after retirement from the USGS. Several other
present and former members are included in your Oral History project.
The main focus of the ECRB was to look at seismic safety of structures built on
the margins of the Bay. I do believe that it has had a major influence in
interjecting state-of-the-art thoughts into the general engineering design and
construction habits of the area.
Unlike building codes, which tend to require minimum values of
earthquake resistance in construction, the ECRB follows a "question, answer,
review and approval" technique. Some of us have talked about describing this
technique formally, and perhaps giving it a formal name, because it is a very
powerful approach, flexible and useful for many situations. It encompasses
engineering lore long before that lore has matured to a point that it can or should
be codified.
Scott: I have always considered the board to be one of BCDC's really valuable
innovations. Would you say a little more about some things the board did?
Wallace: I'll report just one action, related to BCDC's legal responsibility to approve
building on or around San Francisco Bay, as well as major changes in such
structures. The 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake caused a section of the Bay Bridge
to collapse, severing the main direct link between San Francisco and the East
Bay, and creating huge transportation problems. Timing was such, of course,
that Caltrans (the California Department of Transportation) had to do the repair
work promptly, and could scarcely wait for BCDC's formal approval of work on
the structure, which came under the BCDC regulatory power just noted.
The ECRB soon got involved, and the board visited the repair job while it
was in progress. We were all impressed by the promptness of the Caltrans work.
Both at the site, as well as later, however, we voiced great concern when we
were told that the supporting flange from which the deck slab had slipped and
collapsed was to be widened by only about three inches. We thought that was
too little for the long haul.
There was no chance that the all-volunteer membership of ECRB could
follow the day-to-day investigation and repair planning. Fortunately Caltrans
had a contract for Prof. A. Astaneh-asl of the University of California, Berkeley
to conduct an investigation and to do what research and planning was necessary
to retrofit the eastern part of the Bay Bridge. While the ECRB was pleased that
Caltrans would carry out an in-depth study, the board unanimously felt obligated
to issue a warning to members of the full BCDC Commission.
Scott: That sounds like a serious matter. What did the ECRB do, and what was the
response from BCDC?
Wallace: We certainly felt it was serious, so on November 15, 1989 the board issued a
strongly worded statement.
Scott: Would you quote the board's warning?
Wallace: Yes, here it is:
The design criteria of the present bridge, including those used in
retrofitting in the 1970's, are inadequate for the long term. These criteria
cannot be considered appropriate for earthquakes of equal or larger
magnitude than that of October 17, 1989 that are likely to be generated on
nearer sections of both the San Andreas and Hayward faults, such as
those of 1906 and 1886. During such earthquakes failures involving more
serious threats to life safety and impact on the continuing function of the
bridge would be likely.
Scott: That was forthright. What did BCDC do, and was there any other response?
Wallace: The Commission asked for a report on our findings, and I as chairman made an
oral presentation to the full BCDC. Our report made headlines in the local press
for one day, and since then has been totally forgotten. I shudder at the thought
that some day I might have cause to say, "We told you so in 1989." I am afraid
of what will happen when the Bay Bridge is hit by another quake, perhaps closer
than Loma Prieta and with stronger shaking.
Scott: From what I have been seeing in the newspapers, it now appears that in due
course there will be a major retrofitting of the Bay Bridge, if they can agree on
how to finance it.
Wallace: The universities and private consultants are other very important participants
about which I have said little or nothing. Both are essential to effective
earthquake-hazard reduction, and they engage in a spectrum of activities ranging
from research to application.
In engineering I should note specifically the University of California, Berkeley; Caltech, Pasadena; the University of Illinois, Champaign; and MIT, Cambridge. But many others also made significant contributions. The University of New York at Buffalo emerged as a force when the National Science Foundation chose it as the site of the National Center for Earthquake Engineering Research (NCEER). As I understand it, New York state came through with matching money and California did not, thus tilting the support decision of NSF to Buffalo.
Scott: Admittedly, the interested California groups were slow getting their act together,
but also there seemed to be almost a stacked-deck in NSF that was pro-New
York. The whole thing was very painful for Californians, especially academic
researchers who lost significant sources of support.
Wallace: Regarding private-sector leadership, structural engineers Henry Degenkolb and John Blume, as well as the firms associated with their names, provided remarkable leadership in earthquake engineering practice, and many other fine firms have also become eminent in the field, especially in the past decade or so.
Scott: Yes, Henry and John were remarkable engineers, and of course many other
practicing engineers played very important parts over the years. Working
especially through the Structural Engineers Association of California (SEAOC),
the Applied Technology Council (ATC) and similar groups, the structural
engineers were instrumental in developing and promoting codes for seismic
design.
Wallace: Yes, they did. Woodward-Clyde Consultants was a power-house among earth
science consultants for several years, under the guidance of Lloyd Cluff. After
he left, however, others in the organization decided to de-emphasize earth
science, so that capability took a nose-dive. Several of the members of the
organization then banded together to create Geomatrix Consultants. The large
geotechnical engineering firm Dames and Moore also played an important role in
the use of earth science expertise.
I mentioned the Earthquake Engineering Research Institute (EERI)
earlier, and its evolution from a small elite group of earthquake experts with a
closed membership into a large and influential national organization. The
analogous growth of the Seismological Society of America and the explosion of
seismological publications reflect the overall concern and especially the
increased funding for earthquake studies under NEHRP. There has been a
similar increase in the number of earthquake-related geological papers given at
the regional and national meetings of the Geological Society of America.
Unquestionably, the membership growth of both EERI and SSA resulted
directly from money being available to employ earth scientists and earthquake
engineers. Research money from NEHRP, along with the public demand for
safer new and retrofitted structures, have created the dynamic and vital
earthquake-hazard reduction enterprise we see thriving in the 1990s. Thirty
years ago one could not have envisioned the large attendance that gathered at the
joint Pasadena meeting of the SSA and the EERI in Pasadena.
As for geology, geophysics, and seismology, the Universities have been
prime movers. Their role in the evolution of the earthquake program deserves a
full account, but I am not going to attempt to do so here.
Scott: Are there other developments of this nature that you would like to touch on
briefly?
Wallace: So many things were going on in parallel that I have been very selective in trying
to simplify the history of the flow of actions. I have more or less phased out my
account in the 1980s, although the pot kept boiling, and still is (1995). To give
some sense of the scope, diversity and continuity of action, and the many
institutions that have contributed, I shall simply list a few publications not
mentioned previously, with a note after each. The titles of the reports speak for
themselves in suggesting their role in building ideas about earthquake-hazard
reduction.
1. Olson, Robert A., and Wallace, Mildred M., Geologic Hazards and
Public Policy; Conference Proceedings, May 27-28, 1969, Office of Emergency
Preparedness Region Seven, Santa Rosa, California, 1969.
This conference helped alert FEMA's predecessor, the federal Office of
Emergency Preparedness (OEP), to the importance of earthquake
concerns.
2. Joint Committee on Seismic Safety, Meeting the Earthquake
Challenge: Final Report to the Legislature, Submitted Pursuant to Senate
Concurrent Resolution 128 (1969), January 1974.
This report combines the findings of five advisory groups. Karl V. Steinbrugge was Chairman of the combined advisory groups, and others chaired individual groups as follows: 1) Advisory Group on Engineering Considerations and Earthquake Sciences; Gordon B. Oakeshott, Chairman. 2) Advisory Group on Disaster Preparedness; Robert A. Olson, Chairman. 3) Advisory Group on Postearthquake Recovery and Redevelopment; Will H. Perry, Jr., Chairman. 3) Advisory Group on Land Use Planning; George G. Mader, Chairman. 4) Advisory Group on Governmental Organization and Performance; Marcella Jacobson, Chairman. The breadth of state concern and action in California was one of the most important driving forces in the whole program.
3. National Land Agency (Japan), Large-scale Earthquake
Countermeasures Act--Law No.73 (1978.6.7), National (Japan) Land Policy
Series, no.6-2, 1978.
This document is included to note that the concern for earthquake hazard reduction was growing world wide. It parallels many of the concerns and actions taken in the National Earthquake Hazard Reduction Act in the
United States. The US kept in close touch with Japan in developing science,
engineering and governmental response to earthquake hazards.
4. McKelvey, Vincent E., Earthquake Prediction--Opportunity to Avert
Disaster, Conference on Earthquake Warning and Response, Held in San
Francisco, California, on November 7, 1975, U.S. Geological Survey Circular
729, 1975,
This document came a decade after the 1965 Press report on earthquake
prediction. It was an important step in that it emphasized prediction
through contributions from the City of San Francisco, the National
Science Foundation, the State of California, the U.S. Department of the
Interior and the University of California at Los Angeles, Department of
Sociology. Simply getting papers presented by a variety of people from
organizations having different agendas than the USGS tended to give
broader recognition and emphasis to prediction.
5. Steinbrugge, Karl V., Earthquake Hazard in the San Francisco Bay
Area: A Continuing Problem in Public Policy, Institute of Governmental
Studies, University of California, Berkeley, 1968. (Monograph also available in
IGS Franklin K. Lane compilation, The San Francisco Bay Area: Its Problems
and Future, vol. 3, 1972.)
The Steinbrugge monograph was one of many Franklin K. Lane monographs published by the Institute of Governmental Studies to inform the Bay Area public and leadership on major regional problems. It was followed early in 1969 by an article by Stanley Scott in the UC Institute's Public Affairs Report, suggesting a regional approach to seismic hazards through formation of a nine-county earthquake commission resembling the Bay Conservation and Development Commission. The Steinbrugge monograph and the Scott article caught the attention of Senator Alfred E. Alquist and this led to activation of the Joint Legislative Committee on Seismic Safety.
6. Scott, Stanley, Policies for Seismic Safety: Elements of a State
Governmental Program, Institute of Governmental Studies, University of
California, Berkeley, 1979.
Universities were active in helping government to respond to the
earthquake problems, not only in science and engineering but also on
administrative issues. This monograph generalized on California's
experience and suggested approaches other states might use.
7. Federal Emergency Management Agency, An Assessment of the
Consequences and Preparation for a Catastrophic California Earthquake:
Findings and Actions Taken, Prepared by Federal Emergency Agency from
Analyses Carried out by the National Security Council ad hoc Committee on
Assessment of Consequences and Preparations for a Major California
Earthquake, 1980.
In this document it was estimated that the cost of certain earthquakes
could be as high as $69 billion, and deaths as many as 23,000. These
figures added fuel to the importance of earthquake-hazard reduction, and
were used for years in justifying investments in program(s), both in the
governmental and private sector.
8. Mileti, Dennis S., Hutton, Janice R., and Sorensen, John H.,
Earthquake Prediction Response and Options for Public Policy, Institute of
Behavioral Science, University of Colorado, Environment and Man Monograph,
no.34, 1981.
9. The Institute of Behavioral Sciences, University of Colorado has
examined a broad range of natural hazards. Its bimonthly publication Natural
Hazards Observer has helped demonstrate the commonality among different
natural hazards.
10. National Research Council, Panel on Data Problems in Seismology,
Gilbert, Freeman (ch.), Effective Use of Earthquake Data, National Academy
Press, 1983.
This is only one of a continuing series of panel reports of the National
Research Council, National Academy of Sciences, which greatly
influenced the progress of the earthquake hazard reduction program.
Scott: Reviewing this list of publications gives you a feel for the breadth of earthquake-hazard reduction--geographically, institutionally, and in terms of disciplines. It
is a highly interdisciplinary field.
Wallace: I hope those points come through clearly in this history. I think another cardinal lesson is the power of individuals to make things happen, through their personalities, dedication, and, of course, just plain hard work. In my opinion, the three people who influenced the earthquake hazard reduction program most profoundly were Frank Press, Karl Steinbrugge, and George Housner.
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