<?xml version='1.0' encoding='utf-8'?>
<oai_dc:dc xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/ http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:contributor>S.R. Johnson</dc:contributor>
  <dc:creator>Emil D. Attanasi</dc:creator>
  <dc:date>1975</dc:date>
  <dc:description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Public agencies are frequently constrained to procure goods and services in sealed tender&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;markets. Pricing decisions of firms participating in such markets have been analyzed for both&amp;nbsp;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;static and dynamic situations.&amp;nbsp; As might be anticipated, the decision rules obtained&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;in these analyses depend in an integral way on the firm's perception of the behavior of other&amp;nbsp;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;market participants. It is this aspect of the pricing problem to which our paper is directed.&amp;nbsp;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;</dc:description>
  <dc:format>application/pdf</dc:format>
  <dc:identifier>10.2307/1056559</dc:identifier>
  <dc:language>en</dc:language>
  <dc:publisher>Southern Economic Association</dc:publisher>
  <dc:title>Expectations, market structure, and sequential bid pricing</dc:title>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
</oai_dc:dc>